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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LORI JILL LEAVITT, 
Appellant, 
v. 
LABOR COMMISSION, SINCLAIR OIL 
CORP., ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE 
CO., PETROLEUM WHOLESALE and 
AMERICAN HOME INSURANCE 
Appellees. 
APPELLANT REPLY BRIEF 
Appellate Case No. 20070646-CA 
APPELLANT REPLY BRIEF 
JURISDICTION 
All parties to this action admit and agree that the Utah Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter, and as such jurisdiction is proper. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE OCTOBER, 2004 INJURY WAS PROPERLY REPORTED 
As stated previously, whether a claimant properly reports a 
work-related injury is a factual finding which can only be overturned if the 
ALJ's finding is supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of 
the whole record before the court.'" Merriam v. Board of Review , 450 
(Utah App.1991) (quoting Nelson v. Department of Employment Sep. , 161 
(Utah App. 1990)). 
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There is nothing cited in the statute that mandates reporting a 
work-related injury by filing a written incident or accident report. At one time 
a written notice of injury was required within a limited period of time or the 
claimant could be barred from receiving services and benefits, but that law 
was changed. 
Now, the code reads: 
(2) (a) Any employee sustaining an injury arising out of and in 
the course of employment shall provide notification to the 
employee's employer promptly of the injury. §34A-2-407 of the 
Utah Code Ann. 
There is nothing in the code that mandates a written notice to the 
employer. Ms. Leavitt did tell her supervisor that she was hurt at work. She 
also told her supervisor that she was injured twelve years earlier in a car 
accident, an admission that accentuates her credibility. 
The Petitioner firmly believes that her opening brief clearly outlines 
the marshaling of the evidence, but credibility becomes the issue when 
discussing the reporting of the incident. 
The ALJ took great stock in the testimony of Ms. Leavitt's supervisor, 
Robbie Curry. Mr. Curry testified that Ms. Leavitt began work in 2000 or 
2002, while he was the supervisor, and that she became an assistant 
manager in 2003. (Tr at 17-18). 
Mr. Curry testified that on October 5, 2004, Ms. Leavitt told him that 
she hurt her back, and that before this date he did not notice her having a 
back problem. (TR at 26). Mr. Curry admitted that Ms. Leavitt voluntarily 
2 
told Mr. Curry about her back being hurt, and that although she was 
limping, he did not have to ask her what happened because she told him. 
(TR at 26). 
Mr. Curry testified that he did not recall what she told him about how 
she hurt her back though, but said that he knew it wasn't work-related 
because "if she told me is was work related we would have reported it". 
(TR at 27). Unfortunately, this statement is completely self-serving and 
biased toward his initial contention. 
Regarding Ms. Leavitt's credibility, Mr. Curry testified that she had 
previously went through the worker's compensation procedures through 
him and Sinclair when she hurt her wrist, and that she had experience with 
the company regarding the worker's compensation procedures. (TR at 32). 
Mr. Curry testified that there was a first report of the wrist injury, and 
that he remembered the incident. (TR at 32). 
In reality, the wrist injury happened to Ms. Leavitt in 1999, well before 
she worked for Sinclair and while she was working for Ellis Skychief, and 
went through their worker's compensation department. (Volume 3- Exhibit 
009). 
Further, Ms. Leavitt testified that when she was hurt at Skychief she 
did not fill out any papers for worker's compensation, but that her 
supervisors became aware of her injury and filled out what was needed for 
her to receive benefits. (TR at 149). 
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Clearly, Mr. Curry made self serving remarks that Ms. Leavitt had 
experience in filling out documents for worker's compensation benefits 
while with Sinclair, but the reality is that she did not. Further, Ms. Leavitt 
had no experience filling our worker's compensation benefits for herself. 
On direct examination, Ms. Leavitt testified that she told Mr. Curry, 
her supervisor, that she hurt her back at work, and that she thought it was 
from her car accident 12 years ago. (TR at 129-130) 
After marshaling the evidence in our first brief, the "fatal flaw" is 
clearly the self-serving or perjurious testimony of Ms. Leavitt's supervisor, 
Mr. Curry, which should have reduced his credibility. The ALJ relied upon 
Mr. Curry's testimony as the foundation of his Findings of Fact that Ms. 
Leavitt never reported the October, 2004 work-related injury. (See Volume 
1 Exhibit 153-164). 
Further, the ALJ's Findings of Fact were flawed by referencing that 
Ms. Leavitt's back surgery occurred on November 17, 2002, instead of 
1992; and that Ms. Leavitt "suffered from a surgically treated herniated disk 
at the L4-5 level of her lumbar spine" in 1984. (See Volume 1 Exhibit 
153-164). 
The ALJ makes absolutely no reference to Ms. Leavitt stating she 
told her supervisor or other managers that she hurt her back at work, while 
she testified that she did in numerous places of the transcript as previously 
outlined. 
4 
The ALJ lessened Ms. Leavitt's credibility by finding that when she 
was confronted in trial by inconsistent dates of injury and medical records, 
and that she altered the date of the water stacking activity to October 3, 
2004. (See Volume 1 Exhibit 153-164). 
Many dates were altered by both sides to this matter. In fact, 
although Ms. Leavitt stated that she was injured at Skychief in 1998, it was 
actually 1999. (Volume 3- Exhibit 009), and (TR at 149). 
Did Ms. Leavitt report her work-related injury to her supervisor within 
180 days of the injury? Yes, if the court would have reviewed the 
substantial evidence in light of the whole record. Because the Commission 
did not review the substantial evidence in light of the whole record, the 
Petitioner contends that the Commission's Findings were arbitrary and 
capricious because the substantial evidence is that Mr. Curry either lied 
under oath for his employer's purposes, or was negligent in his statements; 
and that although Ms. Leavitt's statements were somewhat inconsistent on 
dates and times, she was completely honest to a fault by stating that she 
thought her injuries stemmed from a 12 year old car accident that was 
completely healed. In effect, Ms. Leavitt reported her October 2004, injury 
in a timely manner. 
2. THE OCTOBER, 2004 INJURY DID ARISE OUT OF AND IN THE 
COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT 
As stated previously, the Utah Supreme Court held that to determine 
causation in worker's compensation cases that first legal causation must 
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be met and then medical causation should be met. Allen v. Industrial 
Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 25 (Utah 1986). 
3. LEGAL CAUSATION FOR THE OCTOBER 2004 INJURY 
Ms. Leavitt admitted that she had a pre-existing condition, albeit the 
previous back problem which occurred thirteen years previous from the car 
accident. But Ms. Leavitt asserted, and all of the medical evidence bears 
out that she fully recovered from her car accident of 1991. Ms. Leavitt had 
no back problems nor medical needs with regard to her back from 
1993-2004. 
First, the court did not properly find facts with regard to causation on 
the October, 2004 injury, because the ALJ held that she was barred from 
benefits for failure to report. As such, Ms. Leavitt properly marshaled the 
evidence in that she completely outlined the pre-existing condition, and 
that nothing occurred for twelve years notwithstanding her vigorous 
employment and lifestyle between 1992 and 2004. Ms. Leavitt contends 
that the higher standard of legal causation is improper. Regardless, 
findings were not made on this subject. 
Notwithstanding the Respondent's assertions, the Petitioner's 
previous brief outlines that while 
Typical activities and exertions expected of men and women in 
the latter part of the 20th century, for example, include taking 
full garbage cans to the street, lifting and carrying baggage for 
travel, changing a flat tire on an automobile, lifting a small child 
to chest height, and climbing the stairs in buildings. (Alien 26). 
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The question is whether or not Ms. Leavitt exceeded a typical 
person's activity and/or exertion by putting away cases of water that 
exceeded 50 pounds of weight. Ms. Leavitt is asserting that she did. 
Ms. Leavitt testified that usually she had to put away 10 to 15 cases 
of water. (Transcript at 118). 
Taking out the trash, changing a tire, or lifting baggage for a flight is 
much different than lifting numerous heavy cases of water, twisting, and 
putting them away. Ms. Leavitt's work exertion was above and beyond 
what a normal person would be doing in everyday life, and the incident 
would meet the legal cause of her injury. 
Further, the Petitioner contends that the Commission's Findings were 
arbitrary and capricious because the substantial evidence is that Ms. 
Leavitt was completely healed for twelve years and her first new back injury 
came about in October 2004, lifting crates of water for the Respondent, 
and as such the higher standard of legal causation was not necessary. 
4. MEDICAL CAUSATION FOR OCTOBER 2004 INJURY. 
Because the ALJ did not address medical causation, and the 
Petitioner addressed it in her previous brief, we believe that nothing more 
need be said regarding a subject where there are no findings of fact with 
which to dispute. 
5. LEGAL CAUSATION FOR THE DECEMBER 2005 INJURY. 
As stated in our previous brief, it is not disputed that by December, 
2005 Ms. Leavitt had a pre-existing condition with her back, namely the 
7 
October, 2004 accident. 
The argument is, was this exertion at work greater than that 
undertaken in normal, everyday life, and did the employment contribute 
something substantial to increase the risk that Ms. Leavitt posed in 
everyday life. (Allen at 26). 
As outlined in Petitioner's previous brief, Ms. Leavitt's exertions in 
putting away the delivery order is indeed an exertion not normally 
undertaken in everyday life, and that the Labor Commission abused it's 
discretion in determining that it was not. The facts previously stated 
regarding the weight and repetition of lifting and turning with these crates 
of product is an extra-ordinary exertion not posed in everyday life. 
Clearly one does not lift a toddler numerous times within a few 
minutes, or change numerous tires in a row as part of normal life. Her 
exertion was atypical and contributed to her injury. As such the legal 
causation standard has been met. 
The Petitioner contends that the Commission's Findings were 
arbitrary and capricious because the substantial evidence shows that Ms. 
Leavitt was completely healed for twelve years and her first new back injury 
came about in October 2004, lifting crates of water, and her second injury 
which greatly worsened the first injury occurred in December, 2005, while 
lifting other crates of company product. As such the higher standard of 
legal causation should not have been imposed upon Ms. Leavitt. Even if 
the higher standard is proper, the first brief completely outlines why we 
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believe benefits are due to Ms. Leavitt. 
6. Medical causation was not addressed by the court. 
Because the Court did not address medical causation, and did not 
make findings of fact, there are no facts or law to argue. 
7. Although the October, 2004 injury has been adjudicated as time-
barred (now on appeal), the October, 2004 injury would evidence a 
pre-existing injury at the same employer and the higher standard of 
legal causation would not apply toward the December, 2005 injury. 
The Respondent argues that any apportionment between the two 
injuries are irrelevant because Ms. Leavitt was never awarded benefits on 
the October, 2004 incident. Fred Meyer v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 
800 P.2d 825,829 (Ut. Ct. Ap. 1990). 
In the Fred Meyer case, an employee sustained a back injury from 
work and received benefits in both 1975 and then again in 1978. A new 
injury took place on the job in 1985, and benefits were denied because the 
ALJ stated that the employee had to prove the higher standard of 
causation due to a preexisting condition. Although this employee had no 
record of a back injury outside of employment contrary to the case at bar, 
the court held that the "higher legal standard of Allen does not apply when 
a preexisting condition is caused by prior work-related injuries previously 
incurred in the same workplace". (Fred Meyer at 828). 
In the present case, Dr. Jaffe's summation letter clearly stated that 
Ms. Leavitt's injuries were attributed to 65% from the October 2004, work 
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injury and 35% from the December, 2005 injury. No part of the injury was 
attributed to the 1991 auto accident. (Volume 2 Exhibit 194). Although Dr. 
Jaffe had Ms. Leavitt's medical records regarding her car accident from 
1991, he did not attribute any of her present injuries to the 1991 accident. 
One hundred percent of Ms. Leavitt's injuries are attributed to her working 
for the Respondents at the same workplace. 
We still contend that even if Ms. Leavitt did not report her October 
2004, injury on time, (which we contend was timely), it was still a 
work-related injury which gives rise to the December, 2005 injury being 
compensable without going through the higher standard of legal causation. 
Even if the higher standard of legal causation is required, we believe 
that our first brief fully outlines that she is entitled to benefits. 
If the court's holding in Allen does now require that, "This extra 
exertion serves to offset the preexisting condition of the employee as a 
likely cause of the injury, thereby eliminating claims for impairment 
resulting from a personal risk rather than exertions at work", then the court 
erred by not looking at the long injury-free time period of Ms. Leavitt's 
back. Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 25 (Utah 1986). 
The 12 years from 1992 through the end of 2004, were injury free for 
Ms. Leavitt's back. During this time she worked hard, physical jobs; she 
4-wheeled; she was pain free. Things changed due to the October, 2004 
injury, and she should be compensated for both it and the December, 2005 
injury. 
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The Petitioner contends that the Commission's Findings were 
arbitrary and capricious because the substantial evidence is that Ms. 
Leavitt was completely healed for twelve years and her first new back injury 
came about in October 2004, lifting crates of water, and her second injury 
which greatly worsened the first injury occurred in December, 2005, while 
lifting other crates of company product. 
CONCLUSION 
The Labor Commission exceeded the bounds of reasonableness and 
rationality by not addressing Ms. Leavitt's 12 years of injury free work, the 
doctor stating that 100% of the injury was work related, and by the either 
the perjury or negligence of the Respondent's key witness, Robbie Curry. 
This Court has held that, "Furthermore, to facilitate the purposes of the 
legislation, the Worker's Compensation Act is to be liberally construed and 
any doubt as to compensation is to be resolved in favor of the applicant". 
USX Corp. v. Industrial Comm, 41 P.3d 468, 471 (Ut Ct App 2002). 
Therefore the Appellant respectfully requests that the Labor Commission 
ruling be reversed, and Worker's Compensation benefits be granted to the 
Appellant for the October, 2004 injury and the December 2005 injury. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ^ a y of July, 2008. 
KESSLER LAW OFFICE 
p\wx<?rx—" 
Kessler, Attorney for Appellant 
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